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ABSTRACT
Classification models are often used to make decisions that affect
humans: whether to approve a loan application, extend a job offer,
or provide insurance. In such applications, individuals should have
the ability to change the decision of the model. When a person is
denied a loan by a credit scoring model, for example, they should
be able to change the input variables of the model in a way that
will guarantee approval. Otherwise, this person will be denied the
loan so long as the model is deployed, and – more importantly –
will lack agency over a decision that affects their livelihood.
In this paper, we propose to audit a linear classification model
in terms of recourse, which we define as the ability of a person to
change the decision of the model through actionable input variables
(e.g., income vs. gender, age, or marital status). We present an
integer programming toolkit to: (i) measure the feasibility and
difficulty of recourse in a target population; and (ii) generate a
list of actionable changes for an individual to obtain a desired
outcome. We demonstrate how our tools can inform practitioners,
policymakers, and consumers by auditing credit scoring models
built using real-world datasets. Our results illustrate how recourse
can be significantly impacted by common modeling practices, and
motivate the need to guarantee recourse as a policy objective for
regulation in algorithmic decision-making.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the context of machine learning, we define recourse as the ability
of a person to obtain a desired outcome from a fixed prediction
model. Consider, for example, a classification model used for loan
approval. If this model provides recourse to someone who is denied
a loan, then this person has the ability to change the input variables
of the model in a way that guarantees approval. Otherwise, this
person will be denied the loan so long as the model is deployed,
and will lack agency in the decision-making process of the model.
Recourse is not formally studied in machine learning. In this
work, we argue that it should be. A model should provide an indi-
vidual with recourse when it is used to allocate a good that should
be universally accessible, such as credit [29], employment [2] and
public services [8, 28]. However, recourse should also be considered
more broadly given that a lack of human agency is perceived as a
source of injustice in algorithmic decision-making [5, 10, 21, 33].
The potential lack of recourse in algorithmic decision-making
is often used to motivate calls for transparency and explainability
[see e.g., 9, 12, 38]. However, transparency and explainability do
not guarantee recourse. As we will show, even a simple transparent
model such as a linear classifier can fail to provide recourse due to
common modeling practices that are difficult to regulate, including:
• Choice of Features: A classifier could use features that are im-
mutable (e.g., female), conditionally immutable (e.g., has_phd,
which can only change from FALSE → TRUE), or should not be
considered actionable (e.g., married).
• Choice of Operating Point: A probabilistic classifier that provides
recourse at a given threshold (e.g., predict yˆ = 1 if predicted
risk of default ≥ 50%) may deny recourse at a more conservative
threshold (e.g., predict yˆ = 1 if predicted risk of default ≥ 80%).
• Out-of-Sample Deployment: A feature that could be altered to
achieve a desired outcome may be missing, immutable, or dis-
tributed adversely in the population where the model is deployed.
The effects of these practices on recourse vary significantly based
on how a model is developed and the population on which it is
deployed (i.e., the target population). In turn, an audit provides a
practical approach to evaluate recourse because it does not affect
model development and could be specialized to consider individuals
within the target population. Even when a model is guaranteed to
provide recourse in a target population, however, it could require
drastic changes that effectively preclude certain individuals from
achieving a desired outcome. Ideally, an audit should therefore
evaluate both the feasibility and difficulty of recourse for individuals
on which a model is deployed.
In this paper, we present a practical toolkit to audit recourse
for linear classification models (e.g. logistic regression models, lin-
ear support vector machines, and rule-based models that can be
expressed as linear models such as rule sets and decision lists).
Our tools can inform stakeholders (e.g. individuals, practitioners,
regulators) with the answers to questions such as:
• Does a model provide recourse to all individuals who are subject to
its predictions?
• How does the difficulty of recourse vary across individuals within a
target population?
• Are there systematic disparities in recourse across subgroups of
individuals in the target population?
• What changes can a person make to attain a desired prediction from
the model?
• How much easier would these changes be if a person could change
immutable attributes, such as race or gender?
Our tools are based on an optimization problem that, given a clas-
sifier and a person in the target population, will identify changes
that the person can make to flip their predicted outcome. Our prob-
lem is formulated to return changes that are actionable, meaning
that they will not affect immutable features, nor alter mutable fea-
tures in an infeasible way (e.g., n_credit_cards from 5 → 0.5 or
5→ −1, or has_phd from TRUE → FALSE). Since finding actionable
changes for discrete features requires searching over a discrete
space, the optimization problem is non-convex and therefore com-
putationally challenging. To let an auditor definitively assert that a
model does not provide an individual with recourse, we solve this
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problem directly: we express it as an integer program (IP) and solve
it with an IP solver (e.g., CPLEX, Gurobi, or CBC).
We solve this optimization in order to design two tools to evalu-
ate recourse within a population of interest:
1. A procedure to measure the feasibility and cost of recourse of
a classifier for individuals in a target population (i.e., for model
development, model procurement, or algorithmic impact assess-
ments [23]). When our optimization problem is infeasible, this
means that there is no actionable change for a person to attain
the desired outcome (i.e., the classifier does not provide recourse
for this person). Accordingly, an auditor can assert that a model
provides recourse to individuals in a target population by solving
our problem for samples from the target population. By com-
paring the cost of recourse among individuals in the sample, we
can assess the difficulty of changes required to achieve a desired
outcome.
2. A method to generate a list of actionable changes that an indi-
vidual can make to flip the prediction of the classifier. We refer
to this list as a flipset and present an example in Figure 1. In
the United States, for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
[36] requires that individuals who are denied credit must be sent
an adverse action notice to explain the principal reason for the
denial. It is well-known that an adverse action notice can fail
to provide actionable information [see 26, 32, for a discussion].
By including a flipset in an adverse action notice, an individual
would know exact changes that they can make to guarantee
approval in the future.
Features to Change Current Values Reqired Values
n_credit_cards 5 −→ 3
current_debt $3,250 −→ $1,000
has_savings_account FALSE −→ TRUE
has_retirement_account FALSE −→ TRUE
Figure 1: Illustrative flipset for a personwho is denied credit
by a classifier. Each item (i.e., row) shows actionable changes
to a subset of features used by the model that will “flip" its
prediction from yˆ = −1 to yˆ = +1. The changes guarantee
that the person will be approved for credit so long as other
features do not change. We describe how to build flipsets in
Section 3.4, and discuss their limitations in Section 5.2.
Related Work. Our work can be viewed as an application of inverse
classification [1], which aims to determine how the inputs to a
prediction model can be manipulated to obtain a desired outcome
[see e.g., 7, 40, for other applications].
Our work is broadly related to tools that explain predictions of
machine learning models at an individual level [see e.g., 24, 30].
Although such tools can provide valuable explanations of how a
model produces a specific prediction, these explanations do not
necessarily reveal actionable changes that will produce a desired
outcome. More importantly, these tools do not provide an auditor
with a way to certify that a model does not provide an individual
with recourse nor a way to measure the difficulty of recourse.
Our ideas build on seminal work on counterfactual explanations
by Wachter et al. [38]1. In particular, the solution to our optimiza-
tion problem is a counterfactual explanation that is actionable and
globally optimal with respect to a user-specified cost function. Our
optimization problem is fundamentally different from an optimiza-
tion problem considered in Wachter et al. [38]. While the latter
problem can extract counterfactual explanations from black-box
models, it does not provide the feasibility or optimality guaran-
tees to audit recourse because: (i) it does not restrict changes to
be actionable; (ii) it only considers changes that are reflected in a
training dataset (i.e., a feasible action is defined as a ∈ {x − x ′}
where x ,x ′ are points in a training dataset) 2. These issues are
difficult to address without formulating and solving a non-convex
optimization problem as we do in this paper.
Other concepts related to recourse in machine learning include:
anchors, which are subsets of features that fix the predicted outcome
[25]; adversarial perturbations, which studies the robustness of pre-
dictions with respect to small changes in input [14]; and strategic
classification, which considers the converse problem of training
classifiers that is robust to manipulation [11, 16]. We provide a
broader discussion on the relationship between recourse and other
objectives in the machine learning in Section 5.3.
Software and Workshop Paper. We provide a software implementa-
tion of our tools and scripts to reproduce our experimental results at
http://github.com/ustunb/actionable-recourse. This work extends a
short workshop paper that was presented at FAT/ML 2018 [31].
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first define an optimization problem that we
solve to evaluate recourse, and then present formal guarantees
related to the feasibility and cost of recourse of a linear classifier.
We provide proofs for all results in Appendix A.
2.1 Optimization Framework
We consider a standard classification task where each individual is
characterized by a vector of features x = [1,x1 . . . xd ] ⊆ X0 ∪ . . . ∪
Xd = X ⊆ Rd+1 and a binary label y ∈ {−1,+1}.
We wish to audit a linear classifier f (x) = sign(⟨w,x⟩) where
w = [w0,w1 . . .wd ] ⊆ Rd+1 is a vector of coefficients andw0 is the
intercept. We denote the desired outcome as yˆ = 1 and assume that
sign(0) = 1 so that yˆ = 1 [⟨w,x⟩ ≥ 0].
Given an individual whose predicted outcome is f (x) = −1, we
aim to determine if there exists an action a such that f (x + a) = 1.
To this end, we solve an optimization problem of the form,
min cost(a;x)
s.t. f (x + a) = 1
a ∈ A(x),
(1)
where:
1Given a model and the features, a counterfactual explanation is the smallest set of
changes to the features that produces a desired prediction.
2To illustrate some practical consequences of (i) and (ii): the approach in [38] could
output an explanation that states that a person can flip their prediction by changing
an immutable feature, due to (i). If so, an auditor could not conclude that the model
did not provide recourse, as there could exist a way to flip the prediction that was not
reflected in the training data, due to (ii).
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• A(x) is a set of feasible actions a = [0,a1 . . . ad ] from x . We
constrain each element of a to produce a feasible value of aj ∈
Aj (x j ) ⊆ {aj ∈ R | aj + x j ∈ Xj }. We let Aj (x) = {0} if feature j
is immutable, and say that a feature is conditionally immutable if
there exists x ∈ X such that Aj (x) = {0}.
• cost( · ;x) : A(x) → R+ is a user-specified cost function that
encodes preferences between feasible actions from x , or mea-
sures other quantities of interest in an audit (see e.g., Sections
3.3 and 3.4). Users can choose any cost function that satisfies
two properties: (i) cost(0;x) = 0 (no action ⇔ no cost); (ii)
cost(a;x) ≤ cost(a + ϵ1j ;x) (larger actions⇔ higher cost).
Solving the optimization problem in (1) for an individual with
features x has different implications with respect to recourse:
• If (1) is infeasible, then no action can achieve a desired outcome
from x . Thus, we have certified that the model does not provide
actionable recourse for an individual with features x .
• If (1) is feasible, then its optimal solution is the minimal-cost
action to flip the prediction of x . In this case, we can use the
solution to create an item in a flipset (see Section 3.4).
Notation, Assumptions, and Terminology. Given a linear classifier
f (x) = sign(⟨w,x⟩), we express its coefficient vector as w =
[wA,wN ], wherewA andwN contain the coefficients for features
that are actionable and immutable, respectively.
We denote the index sets for all features as J = {1, . . . ,d}, for
actionable features as JA(x) = {j ∈ J | |Aj (x)| > 1} and immutable
features as JN (x) = {j ∈ J | Aj (x) = 0}. We drop the dependence
of index sets on x when it is clear from the context.
We assume that the classifier is deployed on a target population
where features belong to a bounded space (i.e., for all x ∈ X, ∥x ∥ ≤
B for a sufficiently large B). We define the following subspaces
based on the predicted label f (x) and the true label y:
H− = {x ∈ X : f (x) = −1} H+ = {x ∈ X : f (x) = +1},
D− = {x ∈ X : y = −1} D+ = {x ∈ X : y = +1}.
2.2 Feasibility Guarantees
We start with a simple sufficient condition for a linear classifier to
provide recourse to all individuals in any target population.
Remark 1. A linear classifier provides recourse to all individuals
with features x ∈ H− if it only uses actionable features, and does not
trivially predict a single class.
Remark 1 is a simple condition that can be used to guide regula-
tions in applications where a classifier must provide recourse, or to
design screening questions for algorithmic impact assessments (e.g.,
“can a person change all of the input variables to the classifier?"). We
observe that converse of Remark 1 is also true: that is, a classifier
does not provide recourse if all features are immutable or it trivially
predicts a single class. In what follows, we therefore restrict our
attention to linear classifiers with non-zero coefficientsw , 0 that
do not trivially predict a single class for the target population.
The following remarks show that the feasibility of recourse
hinges on the boundedness of the feature space.
Remark 2. If the feature values belong to a bounded space, then a
linear classifier with at least one actionable feature provides recourse
to all individuals in any target population.
Remark 3. If the feature values belong to a bounded space, then a
linear classifier with at least one immutable feature may not provide
recourse to some individuals in a target population.
The boundedness of features merits further discussion given
that most real-world classifiers contain a mix of actionable and
immutable features. Given such classifiers, the ability of an auditor
to state that the model does not provide recourse depends on the
bounds that are imposed on real-valued features3. Since infeasibility
has important ramifications in practice, real-valued features should
be bounded judiciously (i.e., so that an auditor will not report infea-
sibility due to overly restrictive bounds)4. This approach has the
drawback in that a classifier may provide recourse by making large
changes feasible. If this is the case, however, then these changes
should be reflected in large values of the cost (see e.g., Section 3.2)
Recourse is not guaranteed when a classifier uses features that
are immutable or conditionally immutable (e.g., age or has_phd).
As shown in Example 2.1, a classifier that uses an immutable fea-
ture could achieve perfect predictive accuracy without providing a
universal recourse guarantee.
Example 2.1. Consider training a linear classifier using a dataset
ofn pairs (xi ,yi )ni=1 wherexi ∈ {0, 1}d and the labelsyi ∈ {−1,+1}
are sampled from the distribution
Pr (y = +1|x) = 1
1 + exp(α +∑dj=1 x j )
Ifα < 1−d , then a Bayes optimal classifier does not provide recourse
to any individual where x j = 0 for an immutable feature j ∈ JN .
In practice, such features may be desirable to include in a model
as they can improve its predictive performance or its robustness to
strategic manipulation.
2.3 Cost Guarantees
In Theorem 2.3, we provide a bound on the expected cost of recourse
in a target population.
Definition 2.2. The expected cost of recourse of a classifier f :
X → {−1,+1}, over the target population is defined as:
costH− (f ) = EH− [cost(a∗;x)],
where a∗ is an optimal solution to the optimization problem in (1).
Our guarantee is expressed in terms of a general cost function
with the form cost(a;x) = c(x) · ∥a∥ , where c : X → (0,+∞) is a
positive scaling function for actions starting from x ∈ X, and X is
a closed convex set.
3Bounds are easier to set for binary and ordinal features as they are bounded by defini-
tion. Bounds on real-valued features exist since the target population is finite. However,
they may be more difficult to set without information on the target population.
4In our experiments in Section 4, we set bounds on real-valued features using the
maximum observed value in the sample from the target population.
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Theorem 2.3 (Expected Cost of Recourse). The expected cost
of recourse of a linear classifier over a target population obeys:
costH− (f ) ≤
1
| |wA | |22
(
π · cD+ − (1 − π ) · cD− + 2cmaxRA(f )
)
,
where:
• π = PrH− (y = +1) is the false omission rate of f in the target
population;
• cD+ = EH−∩D+ [c(x) ·w⊤AxA] is the expected cost of recourse for
individuals such that x ∈ H− ∩ D+ (false negative predictions);
• cD− = EH−∩D− [c(x) ·w⊤AxA] is the expected cost of recourse for
individuals such that x ∈ H− ∩ D− (true negative predictions);
• cmax = maxx ∈H−
c(x) ·w⊤AxA is the maximum cost of recourse
in the target population;
• RA(f ) = π ·PrH−∩D+
(
w⊤AxA ≤ 0
)
+(1−π )·PrH−∩D−
(
w⊤AxA ≥ 0
)
is the internal risk ofwA for x ∈ H−.
Theorem 2.3 implies that we can reduce the expected cost of
recourse by reducing cmax (the maximum cost for recourse) or
RA(f ) (the internal risk of the classifier).
If we define the cost of recourse as cost(a∗;x) = 0 when an
individual receives a favorable predictionf (x) = +1, then the net
expected cost of recourse over the entire target population is
cost(f ) = E[cost(a∗;x)] = Pr (f (x) ≤ 0) · costH− (f ).
Thus, Theorem (2.3) implies that:
cost(f ) ≤ Pr (f (x) ≤ 0)
| |wA | |22
(
π · cD+ − (1 − π ) · cD− + 2cmaxRA(f )
)
.
Accordingly, we can see that changing the decision point of the
classifier so that more individuals in the target populationwill attain
a desirable prediction (i.e., reducing Pr (f (x) ≤ 0)) will reduce the
bound on the net expected cost of recourse under cost(f ).
Theorem 2.3 suggests an interesting implication for settings
where cD+ + cD− < 0. Since π · cD+ − (1 − π ) · cD− = (cD+ + cD− ) ·
π − cD− , we see that one can (maliciously) reduce the bound on
the expected cost of recourse by increasing the false omission rate
π (i.e., by rejecting more individuals with y = +1 who have lower
expected costs).
3 INTEGER PROGRAMMING TOOLKIT
In this section, we first describe how we can solve the optimization
problem in (1) using an integer programming approach, and then
describe how this procedure can be used to audit recourse and to
build flipsets.
3.1 IP Formulation
We consider a discretized version of the optimization problem in
(1), which can be expressed as an integer program (IP) and solved
with an IP solver [see 20, for a list]. This approach has several
benefits: (i) it can directly constrain actions for binary, ordinal, and
categorical features; (ii) it can optimize non-linear and non-convex
cost functions; (iii) it allows users to customize the set of feasible
actions; and (iv) it can quickly recover a globally optimal solution
or certify that actionable recourse does not exist.
We express the optimization problem in (1) as an IP of the form:
min cost
s.t. cost =
∑
j∈JA
mj∑
k=1
c jkvjk (2a)∑
j∈JA
w jaj ≥
d∑
j=0
w jx j (2b)
aj =
mj∑
k=1
ajkvjk j ∈ JA (2c)
1 = uj +
mj∑
k=1
vjk j ∈ JA (2d)
aj ∈ R j ∈ JA
uj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ JA
vjk ∈ {0, 1} k = 1...mj , j ∈ JA
Here, constraint (2a) determines the cost of a feasible action from
precomputed cost parameters c jk = cost(x j + ajk ;x j ). Constraint
(2b) requires any feasible action to flip the prediction of a linear
classifier with coefficientsw . Constraints (2c) and (2d) restrict aj
to a grid of mj + 1 feasible values aj ∈ {0,aj1 . . . ajmj } via the
indicator variables uj = 1[aj = 0] and vjk = 1[aj = ajk ]. Note that
the variables and constraints only depend on actions for actionable
features j ∈ JA since aj = 0 when a feature is immutable.
Customization. Users can easily customize the set of feasible ac-
tions by adding logical constraints to (2). Many constraints can be
expressed using theuj indicators (i.e., without the need to introduce
new variables). To limit actions to change ≤ r features, we can add
the constraint
∑d
j=1(1−uj ) ≤ r . To ensure actions change only one
feature in a subset of features S ⊆ J , we can add the constraint∑d
j ∈S (1−uj ) ≤ 1. Such constraints are required, for example, when
a linear classifier contains a subset of dummy variables to encode a
categorical attribute (i.e., a one-hot encoding).
Discretization. In order to ensure that discretization does not affect
the feasibility or cost of recourse, we must discretize the actions
for real-valued features over a suitable grid.
In Appendix B, we show that discretization does not affect the
feasibility of recourse when we restrict the actions for real-valued
features to a grid that contains the same upper and lower bounds.
We also show how the discretization error in the cost of recourse
can be controlled by refining the discrete grid.
One can avoid discretization entirely by formulating an IP where
we use continuous variables to represent actions for real-valued
features (see Appendix B.3 for a formulation). In light of our guar-
antees in Appendix B, we do not consider this approach because it
unnecessarily restricts users to use linear cost functions.
Speed Ups. Although modern IP solvers can quickly solve instances
of (2) (≤ 0.1 seconds with CPLEX 12.8), we can further reduce solu-
tion time (e.g., for auditing procedures where we solve (2) multiple
times) by: (i) dropping thevjk indicators for actions ajk that do not
agree in sign withw j ; and (ii) declaring {vj1 . . .vjmj } as a special
ordered set of type I, which allows the solver to use a more efficient
branch-and-bound algorithm [34].
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3.2 Cost Functions
Cost functions should be used to encode preferences between feasi-
ble actions or to measure quantities of interest in the target pop-
ulation. However, they should not be used to penalize infeasible
actions as infeasibility can be directly modeled by adding hard con-
straints to the IP formulation. The IP in (2) can optimize a large
class of cost functions because it precomputes these values and
encodes them in the c jk parameters in constraint (2a). Although IP
(2) requires costs to be specified by the values of actions in each
dimension, cost functions do not need to be strictly separable since
the IP can handle some kinds of non-separability by introducing
additional constraints (see e.g., the cost function for auditing in (3)).
We present two “off-the-shelf" cost functions that can be used
for auditing and building flipsets in (3) and (4). These functions
can be adapted by practitioners who wish to design application-
specific cost functions. Our functions measure costs in terms of the
percentiles of x j and x j + aj : Q j (x j + aj ) and Q j (x j ) where Q j (·) is
the CDF of x j in the target population. Unlike standard distance
metrics, cost functions based on percentiles do not depend on the
scale of features, and account for the distribution of features in the
target population. Our functions assign the same cost for a unit
percentile change for each feature, which implicitly assumes that
percentile changes along different features are equally difficult. This
assumption can be relaxed by having a domain expert specify the
relative difficulty of changing features relative to a baseline feature.
3.3 Auditing Recourse
We can use IP (2) to audit the recourse of a linear classifier on a
target population given: (i) the coefficient vector w of the linear
classifier; and (ii) a sample of feature vectors from the target pop-
ulation {xi }ni=1. The auditing procedure solves an instance of IP
for each point such that f (xi ) = −1. It produces as output: (i) an
estimate of the feasibility of recourse (i.e., the % of points for which
the IP is feasible); (ii) estimates of the cost of recourse (i.e., values of
cost(ai ∗;xi ) where ai ∗ is the minimal-cost action). We discuss how
these estimates can be visualized and used to inform stakeholders
in Section 4, and discuss extensions in Section 5.1.
As our cost function, we propose the maximum percentile shift:
cost(x + a;x) = max
j ∈JA
Q j (x j + aj ) −Q j (x j ) . (3)
The benefit of this function is that it produces a meaningful optimal
cost. If the optimal cost is 0.25, for example, then any feasible action
must change a feature by at least 25 percentiles. That is, no action
can flip the prediction without changing a feature by less than 25
percentiles. Using (3) requires replacing constraint (2a) with |JA |
constraints of the form cost ≥ ∑mjk=1 c jkvjk for j ∈ JA.
Minimizing the cost function in (3) is also useful when we wish
to evaluate how the feasibility of recourse changes based on a
user-defined limits on the magnitude of actionable changes. Say
we wanted to measure how many individuals have recourse when
actions for each feature are restricted to changes of at most 50 per-
centiles vs. at most 90 percentiles. Instead of running two separate
audits with action sets that restrict the changes for actionable fea-
tures to at most a 50 or 90 percentile shift, we can run a single audit
that minimizes the maximum cost of an loosely bounded action
set, and compare the number of individuals where the optimal cost
exceeds 0.5 and 0.9.
3.4 Building Flipsets
We build a flipset such as the one shown in Figure 1 by using
an enumeration procedure that repeatedly solves the IP in (2). In
order to reliably provide an individual with recourse, flipsets should
ideally include multiple actions that will flip the predicted outcome.
This is because each action can be infeasible in a way that is only
known by the individual [see e.g., 26, for an example].
In Algorithm 1, we present a procedure to enumerate T ≥ 1
minimal-cost actions with distinct combinations of features. Each
iteration solves the IP to obtain the optimal action a∗, then adds a
constraint to the IP to eliminate actions that use the same subset
of features as a∗. The procedure repeats these steps until it has
recovered T actions, or it has certified that the IP is infeasible
(which means that it has enumerated a minimal-cost action for all
subsets of features that will flip the prediction for x ).
Each action a∗ ∈ A produced by Algorithm 1 can be used to
create an item in a flipset by listing the current feature values x j
alongside the desired feature values x j + a
∗
j for the set of altered
j ∈ S = {j : a∗j , 0}. Since each a∗ ∈ A is a global optimum, all
other feasible actions that alter the same subset of features as a∗
will have a higher cost.
Algorithm 1 Enumerate T Minimal Cost Actions for Flipset
Input
IP instance of (2) for coefficientsw , features x , and actions A(x )
T ≥ 1 number of items in flipset
Initialize
A ← ∅ actions shown in flipset
1: repeat
2: a∗ ← optimal solution to IP
3: A ← A ∪ {a∗ } add a∗ to set of optimal actions
4: S ← {j : a∗j , 0} indices of features altered by a∗
5: add constraint to IP to remove actions that alter features j ∈ S :∑
j∈S
(1 − uj ) +
∑
j∈S
uj ≤ d − 1.
6: until |A | = T or IP is infeasible
Output: A actions shown in flipset
Algorithm 1 can be adapted to produce different kinds of flipsets
by changing the constraint in Step 5 to enumerate different kinds of
successive optima. For example, one can create a flipset containing
mutually exclusive actions by adding the constraint uj = 0 for j ∈ S
to remove all features used by a∗ at each iteration.
As our cost function, we propose the total log-percentile shift:
cost(x + a;x) =
∑
j ∈JA
log
(
1 −Q j (x j + aj )
1 −Q j (x j )
)
. (4)
This function aims to produce flipsets where items reflect “easy"
changes with respect to the target population. In particular, it en-
sures that cost of aj increases exponentially as Q j (x j ) → 1. This
aims to capture the notion that changes become harder when start-
ing off from a higher percentile value (e.g., changing income from
percentiles 90→ 95 is harder than 50→ 55).
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4 DEMONSTRATIONS
In this section, we illustrate how our tools can be used to audit
recourse on linear classifiers for credit scoring. We have two goals:
(i) to show how an audit can provide useful information for different
stakeholders (e.g., individuals, practitioners, and policy-makers);
(ii) to show how the feasibility and difficulty of recourse can be
affected by common modeling practices.
We provide a software implementation of our tools, and code
to reproduce our analyses at http://github.com/ustunb/actionable-
recourse. We trained all classifiers as implemented in scikit-learn,
and used a standard 10-fold cross-validation (10-CV) setup to tune
free parameters and to estimate their predictive performance. We
solved all IPs for auditing and flipset generation with the CPLEX
12.8 IP solver [17] on a laptop with 2.6 GHz CPU with 16 GB RAM.
4.1 Model Selection
We start with a simple experiment to show how our tools can be
used to inform different stakeholders in credit scoring applications.
Setup. We consider a processed version of credit dataset from the
UCI Repository [41]. Here, yi = −1 if person i will default on a
future credit card payment. The dataset contains n = 30 000 in-
dividuals and d = 16 features related to spending and payment
patterns, education, credit history, age, and marital status. We as-
sume spending and payment patterns and education are actionable,
and consider all other variables to be immutable.
We train ℓ1 penalized logistic regression (LR) models for ℓ1
penalty values in the set {1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 500, 1000}. We audit
the recourse of each model on the training data by solving (2) for
each individual i such that yˆi = −1. Our IP includes the follow-
ing constraints to ensure changes are actionable: (i) changes for
discrete features must be discrete (e.g. MonthsWithLowSpending-
InPast6Months ∈ {0, 1 . . . 6}); (ii) EducationLevel can only increase;
(iii) no changes to immutable features.
Results. We summarize the results of our audit in Figure 2, and
present a flipset for a person who is denied credit in Figure 3.
As shown in Figure 2, tuning the ℓ1 penalty has a minor effect
on test error, but significantly affects the cost and feasibility of
recourse. Specifically, classifiers with small ℓ1 penalties provide all
individuals with recourse. As the ℓ1 penalty increases, however,
the % of individuals with recourse decreases as the coefficients for
actionable features are more heavily penalized in comparison to
the coefficients for immutable features.
We observe that it is possible to train classifiers that provide
actionable recourse for a subset of individuals in the target popula-
tion. In such cases, the cost of recourse provides an interpretable
measure of the relative difficulty of attaining difficulty an desired
outcome. Here, we see that increasing the ℓ1-penalty almost doubles
the median cost of recourse from 0.20 to 0.39 for individuals who
retain recourse. This implies that over half of the individuals are
unable to flip their prediction without changing one of the inputs
to the model by 20 to 39 percentiles5
5Since our audit uses the cost function in (3), a cost of q implies an individual must
change a feature by at least q percentiles to attain a desired outcome.
Discussion. Our aim is not to suggest a relationship between re-
course and ℓ1-regularization, but to show how common practices
such as parameter tuning can impact the cost and feasibility of
recourse. Here, a practitioner who is primarily interested in per-
formance could deploy a classifier that precludes individuals from
achieving a desired outcome (e.g., the one that minimizes mean
10-CV test error), even as there exists a classifier that attains simi-
lar performance but provides all individuals with recourse (e.g., a
classifier with a slightly lower ℓ1 penalty). Our tools provide the
necessary information for a practitioner to choose between such
classifiers and incorporate the feasibility and cost of actionable
recourse in their model development pipeline.
Our tools can also identify mechanisms that affect recourse in the
target population by comparing recourse-related metrics different
action sets A(x). For example, one can evaluate how the mutability
of feature j affects recourse by running an audit with an action
set where feature j is immutable (Aj (x) = 0 for all x ∈ X) vs. an
action set where feature j is actionable (Aj (x) = Xj for all x ∈ X).
In this demonstration, such an analysis reveals that the immutable
features resulting in infeasibility pertain to credit history (i.e., a
binary feature set to 1 if a person has ever defaulted on a loan).
Given this information, a practitioner could replace this feature
with a mutable variant (i.e., a binary feature set to 1 if a person
has recently defaulted on a loan), and thereby deploy a model that
provides all individuals with recourse. Such a change may be legally
required due to application-specific regulations or broader policies
on “forgetfulness" [see e.g., 6, 13, for a discussion]. Our tools can
support these efforts by providing measurable evidence in the form
of feasibility and cost estimates.
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
1-penalty (log scale)
19.0%
19.2%
19.4%
19.6%
19.8%
20.0%
10
-C
V
 M
ea
n 
Te
st
 E
rr
or
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
1-penalty (log scale)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
N
on
-Z
er
o 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
All Features
Actionable Features
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
1-penalty (log scale)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
%
 o
f I
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
 w
ith
 R
ec
ou
rs
e
1-penalty (log scale)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
os
t o
f R
ec
ou
rs
e
Figure 2: Model performance and recourse over the training
sample for ℓ1-penalized LR classifiers.We show themean 10-
CV test error (top left), # of non-zero coefficients (top right),
% of individualswith recourse (bottom left), and the distribu-
tion of the cost of recourse (bottom right) for all classifiers.
Actionable Recourse in Linear Classification 7
Feature Subset Current Values Reqired Values
MostRecentPaymentAmount $0 −→ $790
MostRecentPaymentAmount $0 −→ $515
MonthsWithZeroBalanceOverLast6Months 1 −→ 2
MonthsWithZeroBalanceOverLast6Months 1 −→ 4
MostRecentPaymentAmount $0 −→ $775
MonthsWithLowSpendingOverLast6Months 6 −→ 5
MostRecentPaymentAmount $0 −→ $500
MonthsWithLowSpendingOverLast6Months 6 −→ 5
MonthsWithZeroBalanceOverLast6Months 1 −→ 2
Figure 3: Flipset for a person who is denied credit by the
most accurate classifier built for credit. Each item describes
minimal-cost changes for the individual to attain the de-
sired outcome. We enumerated all 5 items in ≤ 1 second us-
ing the cost function in (4) and Algorithm 1.
4.2 Out-of-Sample Deployment
We now discuss an experiment that shows how recourse is affected
by out-of-sample deployment. We consider a setting where a classi-
fiers is deployed on individuals that are underrepresented in the
training population. Our setup is inspired by a real-world feedback
loop with credit scoring in the United States, namely: credit scoring
models are built using training datasets that underrepresent young
adults, since young adults lack the credit history to apply for loans
and produce labeled data, thus making it harder for young adults
to be approved [see e.g., 39, for a discussion].
Setup. We consider a processed version of the givemecredit dataset
[18] from Kaggle. Here,yi = −1 if person i will experience financial
distress over the next two years. The dataset contains n = 150 000
individuals and d = 10 features related to their age, number of
dependents, and recent financial history.We assume that all features
are actionable except for Age and NumberOfDependents.
Our audit compares the cost of recourse for individuals in the
target population for two ℓ2-penalized logistic regression models:
1. Baseline Classifier. This is a baseline model that we use for the
sake of comparison. It is trained using all n = 150 000 individuals
in the processed dataset, which represents our target population.
2. Biased Classifier. This is the model that we wish to audit. We
train this model on a sample of n = 100, 000 individuals from
the processed dataset, where individuals with Age < 35 are
undersampled by 90% from a baseline dataset.
We present both models in Appendix C.2. We set the threshold for
approval for each model to approve 50% of individuals in the target
population (i.e., yˆi = −1 if predicted probability of repaying the
loan is < 94.5%). We compute the cost of recourse using percentile
distributions of features in the target population.
Results. We summarize the results of our audit in Figure 4. As
shown, the cost of recourse can change significantly when a model
is deployed on a population that is different from the population
that is trained on. Here, the median cost of recourse for young
adults in the target population is 0.79, which means that they can
only flip their predictions by a 79 percentile shift in a given feature.
In comparison, the median cost of recourse for young adults in the
baseline model is 0.11, which is significantly lower. We observe
that the differences in the cost of recourse are far less pronounced
for other age brackets, as the median cost for individuals that are
represented in both populations does not appear to change (0.007)
To illustrate the effects of out-of-sample deployment from an
individual perspective, we choose a young adult from the target
population who is denied credit by classifiers and show the minimal
cost-action that will attain the desired outcome from each classi-
fier in Figure 5. We observe that the biased classifier requires the
same individual to make far more stringent changes for the same
individual to obtain a desired outcome.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the cost of recourse in the target
population by age bracket, classifier, and true outcomey.We
show the cost of recourse for individuals that receive an un-
desirable predicted outcome from the biased classifier (left)
and the baseline classifier (right). For each classifier, we plot
the cost distribution for false negatives (top) and true nega-
tives (bottom). Here, the biased classifier is trained using a
dataset that undersamples young adults (Age < 35) while the
baseline classifier is trained using a representative dataset
from the target population. The cost of recourse for young
adults is significantly higher for the biased classifier, regard-
less of their true outcome.
Discussion. Our aim is not to suggest that out-of-sample deploy-
ment increases the cost of recourse, but that it can significantly
affect the cost of recourse. Without theoretical guarantees on how
recourse can change due to distributional differences in the training
data and target population, such effects can only be measured by an
audit using a sample of features from the target population. In prac-
tice, this procedure could be used for model procurement, where
classifiers are trained using datasets that are significantly different
from the target population on which they will be deployed.
There are other mechanisms by which out-of-sample deploy-
ment can affect recourse that are now shown here. In particular,
models that do not allow users to adjust the threshold to a target
population may result in infeasibility or higher costs for that popu-
lation. Moreover, the set of feasible actions can differ significantly
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Biased Classifier
Feature Current Value Reqired Value
NumberOfTime60-89DaysPastDueNotWorse 0 −→ 2
NumberOfOpenCreditLinesAndLoans 1 −→ 12
MonthlyIncome $3416 −→ $23000
DebtRatio 0.006731 −→ 2439.73
Baseline Classifier
Feature Current Value Reqired Value
NumberOfTime60-89DaysPastDueNotWorse 0 −→ 2
NumberOfOpenCreditLinesAndLoans 1 −→ 5
MonthlyIncome $3416 −→ $5980
DebtRatio 0.006731 −→ 49.73
Figure 5: Minimal cost actions for an individual in the base-
line population with Age = 32. We show actions that will re-
sult in approval from the biased classifier (top) and the base-
line classifier (bottom).
between populations. Both of these differences were controlled for
in this experiment: we fixed the same action set, the same costs, and
adjusted the threshold), so the observed effects of out-of-sample
deployment only depend on distributional differences in the out-of-
sample feature.
4.3 Evaluating Disparities in Recourse
We consider an experiment to demonstrate how our tools could
be used to evaluate disparities in recourse across demographic
groups. In particular, we wish to measure the disparity in recourse
between males and females in a target population while controlling
for potential confounders. Here, a disparity in recourse between
males and females occurs if, given comparable individuals who are
denied a loan in the target population, males will be able to make
easier changes in order to obtain credit (or vice-versa).
Setup. We consider a processed version of the german dataset from
the UCI Repository [3]. Here, yi = −1 if an individual is a “bad
customer," which we assume means they have not repaid a loan.
The dataset contains n = 1, 000 individuals and d = 26 features
related to their loan application, financial status, and demographics.
The dataset includes a feature, gender, which is purposely excluded
from model training.
We trained a classifier using ℓ2 penalized logistic regression. We
set the approval threshold for our classifier to approve individu-
als with a predicted probability of 80%. We ran an audit over all
individuals who were denied the loan, and examined disparities
between individuals who were matched on their true label y and
predicted risk Pr (y = +1).
Results. As shown in Figure 6, the cost of recourse can vary between
males and females in the target population. The plot in the top-left
shows the cost for females and males among individuals with a true
label of y = 1, while the plot in the top-right shows the cost for
females and males among individuals with a true label of y = −1.
The disparities in recourse can be seen more clearly in the lift-plots
(middle row), which show the ratio between the median cost of
recourse for females and males.
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Figure 6: Overview of recourse disparities between males
and females in the target population. On the top row,we plot
the distribution of the cost of recourse formales and females
based on their predicted risk and their true label: we plot the
cost for individuals where y = +1 (left) and y = −1 (right). In
the bottom row, we show the ratio of the median cost of re-
course for females/males for individuals where y = +1 (left)
and y = −1 (right).
Female with yi = +1 and Pr(yˆ = +1) = 16.7%
Feature Current Value Reqired Value
LoanDuration 12 −→ 10
LoanAmount $951 −→ $563
NumberOfOtherLoansAtBank 4 −→ 2
SavingsAccountBalance ≥ $500 0 −→ 1
HasGuarantor 0 −→ 1
Male with yi = +1 and Pr(yˆ = +1) = 15.5%
Feature Current Value Reqired Value
LoanDuration 60 −→ 37
LoanAmount $6288 −→ $4427
NumberOfOtherLoansAtBank 4 −→ 2
SavingsAccountBalance ≥ $500 0 −→ 1
HasGuarantor 0 −→ 1
Figure 7: Minimal cost actions for individuals in both sub-
groups matched on the basis of their true label yi and their
predicted probability from the classifier Pr
(
yˆi = +1
)
.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented new tools to measure the feasibility and cost
of recourse for a linear classifier in a target population. We have
shown how these tools can be used to inform a range of stakehold-
ers, including: practitioners, who may unknowingly affect recourse
through common modeling decisions; regulators, who may be in-
terested in certifying that a model provides recourse over a target
population; and individuals, who may wish to know how they can
attain a desired outcome.
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5.1 Extensions
Non-Linear Classifiers. We are currently extending our tools to
audit recourse for non-linear classifiers. The tools in this work
can be immediately extended to this setting in a different (albeit
flawed) manner by solving our IP with a linear approximation
of the local decision boundary in actionable space [i.e., using an
approach similar to the one in 24]. This approach may be useful
as a heuristic to create flipsets, but it is flawed since it does not
provide a guarantee of infeasibility required to audit recourse.
Evaluating Strategic Incentives. Our tools can price incentives in-
duced by a model by comparing the cost of recourse for different
action sets [see e.g., 19]. Consider a case where a credit score con-
tains features that are causally related to creditworthiness (e.g.,
income) as well as ancillary features that have predictive value but
are prone to manipulation (e.g., social media presence). In this case,
we could evaluate incentive structures in a target population by
comparing the cost of recourse using only the causal features, using
only the ancillary features. If changes using the ancillary features
are more costly, then individuals within the target population may
not be incentivized to manipulate the model.
Measuring Flexibility. An interesting extension of our work is to
run an audit where, for each individual in our target sample, we
enumerate all distinct minimal-cost actions that will attain a desired
outcome (i.e., by running the enumeration procedure in Algorithm
1 until the IP becomes infeasible). This produces a collection of
minimal-cost actions that fully characterizes all of the ways in
which an individual can attain a desired outcome. The size of this
collection reflects the flexibility of recourse for an individual, which
could be used to quantitatively assess properties of the recourse
set (e.g., if a classifier provides 16 types of changes that provide
recourse, 15 of which are legally contestable, then the model may be
deemed contestable). This audit would be computationally intensive,
but not necessarily intractable given that enumerating all actions
can be achieved quickly based on the size of the action set (i.e., ≤ 5
seconds for example in Figure 3).
Evaluating Robustness. Although our work has focused on how our
tools could be used to evaluate recourse, they could also be used
to check if a classifier is robust to manipulation (e.g., one can run
an audit to ensure that individuals in a target population cannot
produce a desired outcome by making adversarial changes).
5.2 Limitations
PotentiallyMisleading Flipsets. Unlike adverse action notices, flipsets
do not necessarily reveal the principle reasons for a decision. Fur-
ther, they may not present legally contestable information when
it exists. If a model uses a large number of features, an individual
who receives their flipset could reduce their score by unknowingly
changing features omitted from the flipset. This limitation can be
overcome by providing users with clear guidelines (e.g., a list of all
features, or the signs of their coefficients). Alternatively, one could
produce a worst-case flipset of excessive actions that will flip the
prediction and provide a buffer for interim changes.
Cost Functions. Our off-the-shelf cost functions depend on per-
centile distributions, which may not correctly reflect the difficulty
of recourse (e.g., if there are not enough samples from the target
population, or the sample does not reflect the target population).
In practice, we expect auditors to choose cost functions carefully,
and we provide guidelines to this end in Section 3.2. Our tools
provide flexibility in their choice of cost function, albeit it requires
cost functions that are “almost" separable. We do not see the latter
constraint as a major limitation as such functions may be difficult
to specify.
Potential for Manipulation. Providing individuals with flipsets has
the drawback in that it could lead individuals to maliciously ma-
nipulate the model to attain a desired outcome. Releasing flipsets
could also lead to model theft (see e.g. [35], and efforts to reproduce
the Schufa credit score in Germany in [22]). Manipulation may be
avoided by releasing flipsets with actions pertaining to features that
are causally related to the predicted outcome, or by deploying a
model that only uses such features in the first place [see e.g., 27]. In
light of potential model theft, it would be interesting to study lower
bounds for the number of actions must be collected to faithfully
reconstruct a proprietary model, and whether model theft could
be mitigated by producing flipsets with actions that have weaker
guarantees.
5.3 Broader Discussion
Machine Learning. At first glance, the goal of building a model that
provides recourse may appear to be in conflict with the goal of
building a model that is robust to manipulation. However, this is
not always the case. A model could be trained with features so
that an individual will only have recourse by making constructive
changes (e.g. a person who is denied credit can only be approved
by changing features that improve their creditworthiness, such as
income). A model could also be trained so that an individual can
attain a desired outcome by making “antagonistic" changes, but is
incentivized to make constructive changes (see Section 5.1 for a
discussion on how our tools can evaluate such incentives).
As shown in Section 4, recourse and predictive accuracy are not
necessarily incompatible: it may be possible to train a model that
guarantees recourse that is just as accurate as a model that does
not. As suggested by Example 2.1, however, classification problems
could present trade-offs between recourse and predictive accuracy.
For example, a credit score could include immutable features that
improve predictive accuracy but reduce individual agency in the
model’s decision-making process. Such a trade-off would present
a difficult decision in terms of which model to deploy. Should we
deploy a loan approval that has perfect predictive accuracy but that
precludes certain individuals from receiving loans? Or should we
deploy a model that provides all individuals with recourse but that
may allocate loans inefficiently?
Policy Implications. Individual rights with respect to algorithmic
decision-making are often motivated by the need for agency over
machine-made decisions (e.g., autonomy is a core motivation for
data protection as discussed by, e.g., [37]). Recourse reflects a precise
notion of agency, namely the ability to meaningfully influence a
decision-making process.
While a lack of recourse may be legally contestable in appli-
cations where models allocate goods that should be universally
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accessible (e.g. credit or hiring), it is not clear if the right to re-
course extends to other applications where humans are subjected
to automated decisions. In recidivism prediction, for example, a re-
course audit may reveal contestable information if a defendant who
is predicted to recidivate due to their age and prior criminal history
could not alter this decision by clearing their criminal history6.
While regulations for algorithmic decision-making are still in
their infancy, many existing regulations tackle the need for agency
through transparency and explanation [see e.g., regulations for
credit scores in the United States in 36]. In light of this, we believe
that recourse should be treated as an independent policy objective
since: (i) it reflects a fundamental notion of justice (i.e., that indi-
viduals should have meaningful agency over decisions that impact
their livelihood); and (ii) it is a precisely defined notion that can
be practically regulated in many real-world applications. The tools
in this work provide an important first step towards this goal, as
linear classifiers are often deployed in applications where recourse
is important.
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A OMITTED PROOFS
Remark 1
Proof. Given a classifier f : X → {−1,+1}, let us define the
space of feature vectors that are assigned a negative and positive
label asH− = {x ∈ X | f (x) = −1} andH+ = {x ∈ X | f (x) = +1},
respectively. Since the classifier f does not trivially predict a single
class over the target population, there must exist at least one feature
vector x ∈ H− and at least one feature vector x ′ ∈ H+.
Given any feature vector x ∈ H−, choose a fixed point x ′ ∈ H+.
Since all features are actionable, the set of feasible actions from
x must contain an action vector a = x ′ − x . Thus, the classifier
provides x with recourse as f (x +a) = f (x +x ′−x) = f (x ′) = +1.
Since our choice of x was arbitrary, the previous result holds for
all feature vectors x ∈ H− and therefore the classifier provides
recourse to individuals in the target population. □
Remark 2
Proof. Given a linear classifier with coefficientsw ∈ Rd+1, let
j denote the index of an unbounded feature that can be increased
or decreased arbitrarily. Assume, without loss of generality, that
w j > 0. Given a feature vector x such that f (x) = sign(w⊤x) = −1,
the set of feasible actions from x must contain an action vector
a = [0,a1,a2, . . . ,ad ] such that aj > − 1w jw
⊤x , and ak = 0 for all
k , j . Thus, the classifier provides x with recourse asw⊤(x+a) > 0
and f (x + a) = sign(w⊤(x + a)) = +1. Since our choice of x was
arbitrary, the previous result holds for all feature vectors x ∈ H−
and therefore the classifier provides recourse to all individuals in
the target population. □
Remark 3
Proof. Suppose we have d actionable features x j ∈ {0, 1} for
j ∈ 1, . . . ,d and 1 immutable feature xd+1 ∈ {0, 1}. Consider a
linear classifier with the score function
∑d
j=1 x j +αx j+1 ≥ d where
α < −1. For any x with xd+1 = 1, we have that
∑d
j=1 x j + αx j+1 <∑d
j=1 x j − 1 ≤ d − 1. Thus, x will not have recourse. □
Theorem 2.3
In what follows, we denote the score of actionable features from
x as д(x) = w⊤AxA and the norm of the coefficients of actionable
features as τA = | |wA | |22 .
Our proof use the following lemma in Fawzi et al. [14], which
we have reproduced using our own notation for completeness:
Lemma A.1 (Fawzi et al. [14]). Given a non-trivial linear classi-
fier with wA , 0, the optimal cost of recourse from x ∈ H− can be
bounded as
cost(a∗;x) ≤ −c(x) ·w
⊤
AxA
| |wA | |22
.
The proof of Theorem 2.3 follows.
Proof. First we have
costH− (f ) =
π · (EH−∩D+ [cost(a∗;x)|д(x) ≤ 0]PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)
+ EH−∩D+ [cost(a∗;x)|д(x) ≥ 0]PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≥ 0)
)
+ (1 − π ) · (EH−∩D− [cost(a∗;x)|д(x) ≤ 0]PH−∩D− (д(x) ≤ 0)
+ EH−∩D− [cost(a∗;x)|д(x) ≥ 0]PH−∩D− (д(x) ≥ 0)
)
Note that by Lemma A.1 we have
EH−∩D+ [cost(a∗;x)|д(x) ≤ 0] =
τA · EH−∩D+ [cost(a∗;x)(−д(x))|д(x) ≤ 0]
Likewise for the other three terms, we have We further note the
following:
π · (EH−∩D+ [c(x)(−д(x))|д(x) ≤ 0]PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)
=2π · |EH−∩D+ [c(x)д(x))|д(x) ≤ 0]|PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)
+π · EH−∩D+ [c(x)д(x)|д(x) ≤ 0]PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)
≤2πPH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)cmax
+ πEH−∩D+ [c(x)д(x)|д(x) ≤ 0]PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)
The above also holds forEH−∩D− [c(x)д(x)|д(x) ≥ 0]PH−∩D− (д(x) ≥
0). We omit the details.
Combining these results, we have:
costH− (f ) ≤
τA
(
π · (2PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)cmax
+ EH−∩D+ [c(x)д(x)|д(x) ≤ 0]PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)
+ EH−∩D+ [c(x)д(x)|д(x) ≥ 0]PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≥ 0)
)
− (1 − π ) · (−2PH−∩D− (д(x) ≥ 0)cmax
+ EH−∩D− [c(x)д(x)|д(x) ≤ 0]PH−∩D− (д(x) ≤ 0)
− EH−∩D− [c(x)д(x)|д(x) ≥ 0]PH−∩D− (д(x) ≥ 0)
) )
= τA ·
(
π
(
EH−∩D+ [c(x)д(x)] + 2PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)cmax
)
− (1 − π )(EH−∩D− [c(x)д(x)] − 2PH−∩D+ (д(x) ≤ 0)cmax) )
= τA
(
π · cD+ − (1 − π ) · cD− + 2cmaxRA(f )
)
□
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B ON DISCRETIZATION
In Section 3, we state that discretization does not affect the feasibil-
ity or cost if we choose a suitable grid. In what follows, we formally
show that:
1. Discretization will not affect the feasibility of recourse if the ac-
tions for real-valued features are restricted to a grid that includes
the same end-points.
2. Discretization does affect the cost of recourse, but that the dis-
cretization error in the cost of recourse can be bounded and
controlled by refining the grid.
B.1 Feasibility Guarantee
Proposition B.1. Given a linear classifier with coefficients w ,
consider evaluating the feasibility of recourse for an individual with
featuresx ∈ X where the actions for each feature j belong to a bounded
interval Aj (x) = [aminj ,amaxj ] ⊂ R. Say we solve an instance of the
integer program (IP) in (2) using a discretized action set Adisc(x). If
Adiscj (x) contains the end points ofAj (x) then the IP will be infeasible
whenever the individual does not have actionable recourse.
Proof. Observe that when the actions for each feature belong
to a bounded interval Actsj (x) = [aminj ,amaxj ], then we have that:
max
a∈A(x )
f (x + a)
= max
a∈A(x )
w⊤(x + a)
= w⊤x + max
a∈A(x )
w⊤a
= w⊤x +
∑
j ∈JA
max
aj ∈Aj (x )
w jaj
= w⊤x +
∑
j ∈JA :w j<0
w ja
min
j +
∑
j :w j>0
w ja
max
j
= max
a∈Adisc(x )
f (x + a)
Thus we have shown that
max
a∈A(x )
f (x + a) = max
a∈Adisc(x )
f (x + a).
Note that the IP (2) is infeasible whenever
max
a∈Adisc(x )
f (x + a) < 0,
which is the condition expressed in constraint (2b). Since
max
a∈Adisc(x )
f (x + a) < 0⇔ max
a∈A(x )
f (x + a) < 0,
it follows that the IP (2) is infeasible whenever the individual does
not have actionable recourse under the original action set. □
B.2 Cost Guarantee
We present a bound on the maximum error in the cost of recourse
due to discretization for the cost function cost(a;x) = c(x) · ∥a∥,
where c : X → (0,+∞) is a strictly positive scaling function for
actions from x . Given a feature vector x ∈ X, we denote the dis-
cretized action set from x as A(x) and the continuous action set as
B(x). We denote the minimal-cost action over the discretized action
set A(x) as:
a∗ ∈ argmin c(x) · | |a | |
s.t. f (x + a) = 1
a ∈ A(x)
(5)
and the minimal-cost action over the continuous action set B(x) as:
b∗ ∈ argmin c(x) · | |b | |
s.t. f (x + b) = 1
b ∈ B(x)
(6)
We assume that A(x) ⊆ {a ∈ Rd | aj ∈ Aj (x j )} and denote the
feasible actions for feature j asAj (x j ) = {0,aj1, ...,aj,mj }.Wemea-
sure the refinement of the discrete grid in terms of the maximum
discretization gap, defined as√∑
j ∈J
δ2j
where
δj = max
k=0, ..,mj−1
|aj,k+1 − aj,k |.
In Proposition B.2, we show that the difference in the cost of
course can be bounded in terms of the maximum discretization gap.
Proposition B.2. Given a linear classifier with coefficients w ,
consider evaluating the cost of recourse for an individual with features
x ∈ X. If the features belong to a bounded space x ∈ X, then the cost
can be bounded as:
c(x) · | |a∗ | | − c(x) · | |b∗ | | ≤ c(x) ·
√√ d∑
j=1
δ2j .
Proof. Let N (b∗) be a neighborhood of real-valued vectors cen-
tered at x + b∗ and with radius ∑dj=1 δj :
N (b∗) =
x
′ :
x ′ − (x + b∗) ≤ √√ d∑
j=1
δ2j
 .
Observe that N (b∗) is large enough so that it will contain an action
aˆ ∈ A(x) such that f (x + aˆ) = +1. By the triangle inequality, we
can see that:
∥aˆ∥ ≤ b∗ + aˆ − b∗ ,
≤ b∗ +√√ d∑
j=1
δ2j . (7)
Here the inequality in (7) follows from the fact that x + aˆ ∈ N (b∗).
Since a∗ is optimal, we have that
a∗ ≤ ∥aˆ∥. Thus we have,
c(x) · | |a∗ | | − c(x) · b∗ ≤ c(x) · | |aˆ | | − c(x) · b∗
≤ c(x) ·
√√ d∑
j=1
δ2j .
□
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B.3 IP Formulation with Continuous Actions
for Real-Valued Variables
For completeness, we present a IP formulation that does not require
discretizing real-valued features that we discuss in Section 3.
Given a linear classifier with coefficientsw = [w0, . . . ,wd ] and
an individual with features x = [1,x1, . . . ,xd ], we recover the
solution to the optimization problem in (1) for a linear cost function
of the form cost(a;x) = ∑j c jaj by solving the IP:
min cost
s.t. cost =
∑
j∈JA
c jaj (8a)∑
j∈JA
w jaj ≥
d∑
j=0
w jx j (8b)
aj ∈ [aminj , amaxj ] j ∈ Jcts (8c)
aj =
mj∑
k=1
ajkvjk j ∈ Jdisc
1 = uj +
mj∑
k=1
vjk j ∈ Jdisc
aj ∈ R j ∈ Jdisc
uj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ Jdisc
vjk ∈ {0, 1} k = 1...mj j ∈ Jdisc
Here, we denote the indices of all actionable features as JA = Jcts ∪
Jdisc, where Jcts and Jdisc are the index sets of real-valued features
and discrete-valued features, respectively. The main differences
between the IPs in 2 and 8 are that we represent the actions for real-
valued features j ∈ Jcts as continuous variables aj ∈ [aminj ,amaxj ]
in (8c), and that we only define the indicator variables uj and vjk
for discrete features.
The IP in (8) has the drawback that is requires users to specify
a linear cost function, and is slightly harder to customize and op-
timize when we wish to introduce constraints on feasible actions.
If we wish to limit the number of features that can be changed,
for example, we must introduce indicator variables of the form
uj = 1[aj , 0] for real-valued features j ∈ Jcts. These variables can
only be set using “Big-M" constraints, which are difficult to opti-
mize and may produce numerical issues [see e.g., the introduction
to 4, for a recent discussion]. In contrast, the IP in (8) can handle
such constraints directly.
C SUPPORTING MATERIAL FOR
DEMONSTRATIONS
C.1 Section 4.1
Figure 8: Coefficient values of ℓ1-penalized logistic regres-
sion models for credit over the regularization path.
C.2 Section 4.2
Feature Coefficient Actionable
RevolvingUtilizationOfUnsecuredLines 0.000060 Y
Age 0.046162 N
NumberOfTime30-59DaysPastDueNotWorse -0.548909 Y
DebtRatio 0.000073 Y
MonthlyIncome 0.000039 Y
NumberOfOpenCreditLinesAndLoans 0.018042 Y
NumberOfTimes90DaysLate -0.315151 Y
NumberRealEstateLoansOrLines -0.072246 Y
NumberOfTime60-89DaysPastDueNotWorse 0.822114 Y
NumberOfDependents -0.057853 N
Table 1: Coefficients of a ℓ2-penalized logistic regression
model for givemecredit. This model is trained on the biased
sample that undersamples young adults in the target popu-
lation. It has a mean 10-CV test AUC of 0.608 and a training
AUC of 0.610.
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Feature Coefficient Actionable
RevolvingUtilizationOfUnsecuredLines 0.000052 Y
Age 0.042900 N
NumberOfTime30-59DaysPastDueNotWorse -0.357357 Y
DebtRatio 0.000071 Y
MonthlyIncome 0.000035 Y
NumberOfOpenCreditLinesAndLoans 0.012766 Y
NumberOfTimes90DaysLate -0.238196 Y
NumberRealEstateLoansOrLines -0.070658 Y
NumberOfTime60-89DaysPastDueNotWorse 0.566249 Y
NumberOfDependents -0.053589 N
Table 2: Coefficients of a ℓ2-penalized logistic regression
model for givemecredit. This model is trained on a represen-
tative sample from the target population. It has a a 10-CV
AUC of 0.690 and a training AUC of 0.691.
C.3 Section 4.3
Feature Coefficient Actionable
ForeignWorker 0.949670 N
Single 0.427337 N
Age 0.011393 N
LoanDuration -0.025882 Y
LoanAmount -0.000082 Y
LoanRateAsPercentOfIncome -0.275132 Y
YearsAtCurrentHome -0.004816 Y
NumberOfOtherLoansAtBank -0.294827 Y
NumberOfLiableIndividuals -0.130077 Y
HasTelephone 0.411961 Y
CheckingAccountBalance ≥ 0 -0.463280 Y
CheckingAccountBalance ≥ 200 0.650683 Y
SavingsAccountBalance ≥ 100 0.307218 Y
SavingsAccountBalance ≥ 500 0.725984 Y
MissedPayments -0.289611 Y
NoCurrentLoan -0.975011 Y
CriticalAccountOrLoansElsewhere 0.964001 Y
OtherLoansAtBank -0.463337 Y
HasCoapplicant -0.586182 Y
HasGuarantor 0.963116 Y
OwnsHouse 0.730532 Y
RentsHouse 0.262407 N
Unemployed -0.061270 Y
YearsAtCurrentJob < 1 -0.236892 Y
YearsAtCurrentJob ≥ 4 0.423143 Y
JobClassIsSkilled 0.136502 N
Table 3: Coefficients of a ℓ2 penalized logistic regression
model for german. This model has a mean 10-CV test AUC
of 0.710 and a training AUC of 0.719
